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The National League West is a division of extremes. On one end, we have the back-to-back champion Dodgers, with their payroll that rivals some divisions’ combined spending. On the other hand, we have the Rockies, MLB’s worst team in 2025 and an organization infamous for being way behind the rest of the league. Somewhere in between are the Padres, Giants and Diamondbacks, all dealing with spending constraints while trying to contend in a competitive National League.
How did these five teams do in terms of improving their rosters this winter? Let’s grade ‘em.
Significant outgoing free agents: SP Clayton Kershaw (retired), SP Andrew Heaney (retired), LF Michael Conforto, RP Michael Kopech, RP Kirby Yates, INF Enrique Hernandez
Major moves:
Signed OF Kyle Tucker to a 4-year deal
Signed RP Edwin Diaz to a 3-year deal
Re-signed 2B Miguel Rojas to a 1-year deal
Re-signed RP Evan Phillips to a 1-year deal
After the Dodgers became the first team in a quarter-century to win back-to-back World Series titles, the baseball world waited to see what Los Angeles had in store this offseason. Like any team, the Dodgers came into the winter with some roster holes. But with an already loaded lineup, stacked rotation and overwhelming payroll, the idea of more significant additions seemed far-fetched. No matter. Early in the winter, the Dodgers shocked the industry by landing arguably the best closer in baseball, Edwin Díaz, on a three-year, $69 million deal. Díaz gives L.A. something it hasn’t had even in its recent run of dominance: a shutdown closer.
It would have been an A+ offseason for the reigning World Series champions if they only landed the three-time All-Star closer and brought back the majority of their championship roster. But as the Dodgers are known to do, they went above and beyond. After waiting in the shadows, they pounced and signed the offseason’s top free agent, Kyle Tucker … drawing the ire of rival baseball fans and executives everywhere.
The Dodgers have a superstar-studded roster and have made themselves as close to infallible as any team in recent history. They go into 2026 as the overwhelming favorites to win another title.
Significant outgoing free agents: RP Robert Suarez, 1B Luis Arraez, 1B Ryan O’Hearn, SP Nestor Cortes, SP Dylan Cease
Major moves:
Re-signed SP Michael King on a 3-year deal
Signed LF Miguel Andujar on a 1-year deal
The Padres, like the Dodgers, have an extremely top-heavy roster when it comes to their talent. And with the combination of Manny Machado, Fernando Tatís Jr. and Jackson Merrill, San Diego has the foundational pieces in the lineup. That’s something many teams around baseball would covet.
But unlike with L.A., the money tied up in several of the Padres’ stars — combined with the uncertainty surrounding their ownership situation — has handcuffed the team from making other big moves via free agency. And as great as general manager A.J. Preller is at making trades, even he has had a tough time this winter finding creative ways to add to his roster.
Losing Dylan Cease to the Toronto Blue Jays was huge, as it increases San Diego’s need for starting pitching — which they didn’t address prior to the start of spring training. But the Padres were able to re-sign Michael King, who when healthy is one of the better pitchers in the National League. And they were able to add outfielder Miguel Andujar, giving them another solid bat behind Tatis, Machado and Merrill.
Significant outgoing free agents: SP Justin Verlander, 1B Wilmer Flores
Major moves:
Signed LF Harrison Bader to a 2-year deal
Signed INF Luis Arraez to a 1-year deal
Signed SP Adrian Houser to a 2-year deal
Signed SP Tyler Mahle to a 1-year deal
It has been an interesting offseason in the Bay, as the Giants have tried to find their way out of the doldrums of mediocrity (321-327 the past four seasons). Given that this is one of the teams in baseball with the resources to make a huge splash, there was reason to believe president of baseball operations Buster Posey would make the most of this offseason. But that’s not exactly what happened.
The two biggest moves of the Giants’ offseason have come in the past few weeks. The team brought in Harrison Bader to play center fielder, allowing Jung-Hoo Lee to shift to right. The Giants then signed Luis Arraez to a one-year deal to play second base, giving them a table-setter atop the lineup. They also signed right-handers Tyler Mahle and Adrian Houser, who should provide quality innings and rotation depth.
In totality, none of these are bad moves, and all are likely to help the Giants be a better team in 2026 than they were in 2025. But in a division with as much high-end talent as the Dodgers and Padres have, you have to wonder if it’ll be enough.
Not to be forgotten, the Giants’ biggest acquisition of the winter might be first-year manager Tony Vitello, who is beginning his first season in professional baseball after serving as the head baseball coach at a highly successful Tennessee program from 2018 to 2025.
Significant outgoing free agents: SP Zac Gallen, C James McCann
Major moves:
Acquired 3B Nolan Arenado from the Cardinals in exchange for SP Jack Martinez
Signed SP Merrill Kelly to a 2-year deal
Signed SP Michael Soroka to a 1-year deal
Signed 1B Carlos Santana to a 1-year deal
For the Arizona Diamondbacks, this offseason can probably be characterized by what they didn’t do, as opposed to what they did do. For months this winter, rumors swirled about the possibility that the team would trade All-Star second baseman Ketel Marte. And while other teams called and made their pitches to GM Mike Hazen, in the end, Marte stayed put.
But with so much energy focused on Marte, the D-backs hardly made any significant improvements to the rest of their roster. The biggest splash was probably their trade to acquire eight-time All-Star third baseman Nolan Arenado, though given Arenado’s decline the past few seasons, it was largely a salary dump for the Cardinals. The D-backs’ other two major moves this winter were bringing back right-hander Merrill Kelly after trading him at last summer’s deadline and signing 39-year-old DH/1B Carlos Santana.
Arizona could still reunite with frontline starter Zac Gallen and will be getting former NL Cy Young Award winner Corbin Burnes back after the All-Star break, which will provide a significant boost to the rotation. But in the meantime, will the D-backs be able to score enough runs? That question is especially worrisome with outfielder Corbin Carroll requiring surgery for a broken hamate bone and projected to miss the start of the season.
Significant outgoing free agents: 2B Thairo Estrada, SS Orlando Arcia, SP German Marquez
Major moves:
Signed UTL Willi Castro to a 2-year deal
Signed SP José Quintana to a 1-year deal
Signed SP Michael Lorenzen to a 1-year deal
Signed SP Tomoyuki Sugano to a 1-year deal
Acquired 2B Edouard Julien and RP Pierson Ohl from the Twins in exchange for SP Jace Kaminska and cash
An “incomplete” might be a better grade to give the Rockies, considering they didn’t do much to improve their major-league roster or farm system. They did sign utility man Willi Castro to a one-year deal and just this week brought in Tomoyuki Sugano and José Quintana to be innings-eaters, but that’s about it. Not exactly needle-moving acquisitions, but … it’s something, right?
Perhaps the Rockies‘ biggest move of the offseason was bringing in longtime baseball (and football) executive Paul DePodesta to be the team‘s new president of baseball operations. That marks the organization’s first major front-office shakeup since the team’s inception in 1993, as Colorado finally brought in someone from outside the organization. That in and of itself is a huge win for the Rockies, but only time will tell if it works.
There were 24 relief pitchers who saw an increase by five or more save opportunities while converting five or more saves in 2025 compared to 2024. When we filter down to which relievers had 15 or more saves in 2025 than in 2024, the list shrinks to eight players. Relievers that met those thresholds include Andrés Muñoz, Aroldis Chapman, Cade Smith, Carlos Estévez, Daniel Palencia, Emilio Pagán, Jeff Hoffman and Will Vest. We have a mixture of relievers with closer experience seeing a higher workload and pitchers who consistently earned save chances with success in 2025.
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The visual below shows the relievers who met the previous threshold of five or more save opportunities and five or more saves in 2025 than in 2024:
On the flip side, the list of relievers who saw their save opportunities and conversions drop by five or more includes Camilo Doval, Emmanuel Clase, José Alvarado, Josh Hader, Kyle Finnegan, Mason Miller and Ryan Helsley. Alvarado was the only reliever with single-digit saves. Doval was leading the Giants in saves (15), though Ryan Walker ate into his save chances, with 10 in the first half of the season before Doval was traded to the Yankees.
Meanwhile, Clase missed the final two months after being investigated for alleged gambling charges, so Cade Smith took on a heftier load. Similar to Doval, Helsley was traded to another team (Mets), and he didn’t convert a save in the second half out of four chances. Helsley signed with the Orioles and should slide into the primary closer for the new team (more on him below). Similarly, Finnegan was traded from the Nationals to the Tigers. Finnegan logged four saves out of five chances in the second half of the season with the Tigers.
This data reminds us that the closer market can have consistent players to target while understanding there can be volatility with trades, injuries and player struggles. We have several potential reliever targets, fades and sleepers to consider during draft season.
Ryan Helsley signed with the Orioles, filling a void with Félix Bautista undergoing shoulder surgery in August 2025. After a career season of 49 saves in 2024, the Cardinals traded Helsley to the Mets, leading to a significant role change. The 2025 ratios were awful for Helsley, though his 4.03 xERA and 15% swinging-strike suggested the skills still existed, with poor luck. Regression was expected for Helsley, though, after a 2.04 ERA, 3.52 xERA and an 18% swinging-strike rate in 2024.
Helsley’s slider was nasty, eliciting a 23.1% swinging-strike rate, as a pitch he throws often to right-handed hitters (52.7%) and lefties (41.8%). He throws a high-velocity, gyro-like slider that makes hitters chase it outside the zone, with a career 40.3% chase rate. We want at least one dominant pitch for a closer, which Helsley possesses.
Meanwhile, Helsley’s four-seamer has been crushed against right-handed hitters (.526 wOBA, .455 xwOBA) and left-handed hitters (.471 wOBA, .375 xwOBA). That’s concerning because Helsley’s four-seam generates above-average induced vertical break while paired with above-average extension that comes from a high arm slot (62 degrees). He might be trying to pound the heater in the zone, expecting to find success, though he may benefit from lowering the zone rates. For context, Helsley threw the four-seamer in the zone 60 to 61% of the time over the past two seasons.
If Helsley makes a small tweak to the four-seam locations, we will have more confidence in his dominance. Regardless, Helsley should be the leading closer option for the Orioles after they relied on Keegan Akin (8 saves), Dietrich Enns (2 saves), and Corbin Martin (2) with Bautista sidelined.
Once Doval was traded, Ryan Walker had seven saves with Spencer Bivens (3) and Tristan Beck (2) being the other relievers with save conversions in the second half of the season. Walker comes at hitters from a low arm and cross-body approach, which likely involves volatility in his command. Interestingly, Walker’s swinging-strike rate fell to 9% in 2025 after being around 12-13% in the previous two seasons. That’s slightly concerning to have a reliever earning save chances with below-average stuff from a whiff standpoint.
Walker’s slider typically had been filthy, inducing an 18% swinging-strike rate throughout his career. Unfortunately, Walker’s slider swinging-strike rate fell to 12.8% in 2025. The slider’s pitch movement profiles hadn’t changed much, with 14-15 inches of glove-side sweep. There’s a good chance that the slider’s whiffs and results regressed based on the pitch locations.
When Walker left the slider in the zone, right-handed hitters were crushing it in 2025. That’s evident by Walker’s slider allowing a .294 wOBA (.307 xwOBA) in 2025 and a .256 wOBA (.271 xwOBA) in 2024 against right-handed hitters when thrown in the zone.
Nonetheless, with Doval gone, Walker should eat up the majority of the Giants’ save chances.
The one wild card involves the Giants having a new manager in Tony Vitello, who comes from the college ranks formerly as the coach at the University of Tennessee. Will Vitello rely on Walker or make it somewhat of a closer committee in San Francisco? Walker’s draft price is somewhat discounted, making him an interesting mid-round second closer to target.
The Cubs tried to lean on veteran Ryan Pressly as their closer in 2025, but he struggled and they turned to Daniel Palencia, who was one of the waiver-wire gems at the closer position in 2025. He dealt with a shoulder strain in early September, then returned later that month. There’s a chance Palencia could take another step forward in 2026, given the above-average 13.6% swinging-strike rate. Like other relievers, Palencia struggled with control, though his ball rate improved to 34% after being around 39-40% in the previous two seasons.
Palencia’s slider continues to headline his arsenal, with a 19.6% swinging-strike rate in 2025, compared to a career average of 21.5%. The slider added nearly three inches of downward movement in 2025, as a breaking ball that he throws low and away to right-handed hitters. Palencia’s slider generates whiffs and weak contact (.231 wOBA, .175 xwOBA) against right-handed hitters in 2025.
Unfortunately, left-handed hitters crushed Palencia’s slider (.383 wOBA, .313 xwOBA) and four-seamer (.352 wOBA, .366 xwOBA). That suggests Palencia needs an offering to suppress left-handed hitters or they’ll continue to do damage. He sprinkled in a splitter 38 times (8.6%) that allowed a .147 wOBA (.225 xwOBA) against lefties in 2025. It’s easier said than done, but it would benefit Palencia to work on developing a splitter to attack lefties.
That said, if Palencia struggles to find another pitch to address the issues against left-handed hitters, we could see the Cubs turn toward Phil Maton or Hunter Harvey.
Trevor Megill (6) and Abner Uribe (5) shared save chances in the second half of the 2025 season. Megill dealt with an elbow strain in late August, causing him to miss over one month before returning in late September. It’s concerning when a pitcher ends the season injured; hard to have injury optimism heading into the following season. That’s especially true with Megill, who averaged over one month on the injured list in four of the past five seasons.
Megill has been successful, compiling 51 saves over the past two seasons. The skills support Megill’s save chances, evidenced by a 32% ball rate and a nearly 15% swinging-strike rate over the past two seasons. Megill saw the ratios improve late in the 2025 season, with a slight uptick in his swinging-strike rate. We’re not denying Megill’s skills and recent track record, but there’s a good chance Megill misses time again in 2026, opening the door for Uribe.
Uribe’s stuff finally led to save chances in 2025, though there should be some ratio regression, since he had a 2.80 xERA, over one run higher than his actual ERA (1.67). With Uribe’s sinker and slider mix, he provides that optimal groundball and strikeout approach. That’s evident in Uribe’s sinker generating a 64% groundball rate and the slider inducing a 19% swinging-strike rate.
The draft market has been torn on Megill and Uribe, but we prefer to take a chance on Uribe since he possesses the stuff to generate whiffs and weak contact, without the injury history of Megill.
In the second half of the season, Dennis Santana had 10 of the 12 saves for the Pirates. They traded David Bednar to the Yankees, aligning with Santana earning save chances. Bednar struggled in 2024, and Aroldis Chapman stole save opportunities. Santana has been waiting for his chance, and he performed relatively well in 2025.
He might be due for regression since he outperformed his expected ERA (3.96), with an actual ERA of 2.18. Santana showed better control, with a 30% ball rate in 2025 compared to a career ball rate at 34%. Meanwhile, Santana’s swinging-strike rate was above 13% again in 2025, suggesting there’s above-average stuff, but not near-elite. However, Santana does have one near-elite pitch for whiffs via the slider, given a 20.1% swinging-strike rate.
As Santana should, he increased his slider usage to 46.4% in 2025, up from 32.3% in 2024. Santana made a 10 percentage point increase in usage to right-handed hitters (49.3%) with a 20-point jump to lefties (42.5%). Interestingly, Santana’s slider doesn’t have an above-average movement profile, yet it generates weak contact against righties (.207 wOBA, .222 xwOBA) and lefties (.225 wOBA, .270 xwOBA).
That could suggest Santana commands his slider well since it doesn’t have a filthy movement profile. Or Santana’s slider keeps hitters guessing with another pitch having a similar profile, which can be seen via the induced movement profiles above. It’s probably a mixture of both factors, with the cutter being a harder-thrown version of the slider. Santana’s cutter elicits weak contact (.265 wOBA, .322 xwOBA) to right-handed hitters. However, Santana’s cutters tend to be less effective against lefties (.313 wOBA, .317 xwOBA) in 2025.
Besides Bednar, Santana had the highest game leverage index on the Pirates, showing the team trusts him in high-leverage situations. Santana fits nicely as an RP2 for around 25 saves at a cheaper draft cost.
Pete Fairbanks logged 20 or more saves for three consecutive seasons, though he earned 77% of the team’s saves in 2025, which was unusual. For context, Fairbanks had 45% of the team’s saves in 2024 and 60% of the team’s saves in 2023. It’s worth noting that Fairbanks has dealt with his fair share of injuries in 2023 and 2024, causing him to miss over one month in both seasons. Meanwhile, Fairbanks was healthy in 2025.
He signed with the Marlins in December on a one-year deal worth $13 million, so it’s a low-risk investment for the Marlins that they could move at the trade deadline. When healthy, Fairbanks typically performed well with the strikeout skills to support the outcomes. Fairbanks had a 12.8% swinging-strike rate in 2025, with a career low in 2024 (9.5%). However, Fairbanks boasted a swinging-strike rate north of 13% throughout his career.
Interestingly, Fairbanks’s slider took a slight step back from a whiff standpoint, with a 13% swinging-strike rate in 2025 and 10.3% in 2024. That aligns with the overall dip in swinging-strike rate during the past two seasons. The slider’s movement profile suggests more whiffs on breaking pitch that generates 6.5 inches more downward movement than the average slider. Typically, we find pitches that possess more vertical movement tend to elicit more whiffs.
My guess would be slider locations might be an issue, though a reliever’s pitches can be volatile in smaller samples. Based on the slider heatmaps, it looks like he might be throwing it too often in the heart of the zone, which leads opposing hitters to wait on the slider. We’ve heard rumors that the Rays’ pitchers have been instructed to throw their best pitches in the heart of the zone, to see whether opposing hitters can hit them. Fairbanks may want to focus on a location adjustment for the slider if the high-end downward movement isn’t generating the expected whiffs.
The other concern involves Fairbanks having potential left-handed hitter problems. Left-handed hitters have been doing damage and making loud contact against the four-seamer over the past two seasons, with the slider being decent, but not dominant. That’s especially true since left-handed hitters have been crushing the heater, evidenced by a .341 wOBA (.376 xwOBA) in 2025 and a .379 wOBA (.369 xwOBA) in 2024. Fairbanks may want to develop the changeup that he hardly uses, with a career 18% swinging-strike rate. Furthermore, Fairbanks’s changeup allowed a .204 wOBA (.232 xwOBA) against left-handed hitters in a small sample of 40 pitches in 2025.
The Marlins have been rotating relievers as their primary closer. A.J. Puk (15), Tanner Scott (12) and Dylan Floro (7) led the Marlins in saves in 2023. Scott (18) and Calvin Faucher (6) were the only two Marlins’ relievers with five or more saves in 2024. Then Faucher (15) led the team in saves with Ronny Henriquez (7) sneaking into the mix in 2025. Faucher still remains on the Marlins, but Fairbanks showed he can handle the majority of the team’s save opportunities with the Rays across multiple seasons.
The Rays value stuff, as they rank second in Stuff+ behind the Phillies. Griffin Jax possesses near-elite stuff, evidenced by two primary pitches eliciting a swinging-strike rate above 21% via the slider (21.1%) and changeup (27%). Jax’s sweeper is nasty against right-handed hitters, allowing a .149 wOBA (.168 xwOBA). On the flip side, Jax’s changeup serves as a deadly option to lefties, with a .146 wOBA (.150 xwOBA).
Edwin Uceta could be in the mix for saves with Jax, making this a muddy reliever room to figure out. Uceta’s arsenal doesn’t grade well in Stuff models, likely because he throws from a lower arm angle (14 degrees), giving him a Luis Castillo-type arm slot. He throws two pitches with an above-average swinging-strike rate, including the four-seam (17.6%) and changeup (19.1%).
With the lower armslot, Uceta’s changeup and four-seam seem to have reverse splits, where the changeup performs better against right-handed hitters (.191 wOBA, .258 xwOBA) and four-seam is better against lefties (.221 wOBA, .227 xwOBA).
Uceta’s draft price has been slightly lower than Jax’s. We’ll want to take shots at the Rays’ closer options, but don’t over-invest in either one.
Mason Miller, Padres
Edwin Díaz, Dodgers
Cade Smith, Guardians
Andrés Muñoz, Mariners
Jhoan Duran, Phillies
Devin Williams, Mets
David Bednar, Yankees
Aroldis Chapman, Red Sox
Jeff Hoffman, Blue Jays
Ryan Helsley, Orioles
Raisel Iglesias, Braves
Ryan Walker, Giants
You have questions about the 2026 NBA All-Star Game, which for the first time pits the USA vs. World in a round-robin tournament of three teams across four 12-minute games.
It is confusing, and the story of how we got here is a long and winding one, featuring a ton of wrinkles to the format, each of which has failed to inspire competition from the players.
Let us summarize that story for you, as we answer your questions.
The 2026 NBA All-Star Game is on Sunday at 5 p.m. ET on NBC.
Prior to that: The celebrity game, Rising Stars competition and HBCU Classic will be held in succession on Friday, beginning at 7 p.m. ET; and the slam dunk and 3-point contests, as well as the return of the Shooting Stars competition, will highlight All-Star Saturday, which begins at 5 p.m. ET.
NBC will air all events for the first time since 2002.
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The Los Angeles Clippers will host the 2026 NBA All-Star Game at the Intuit Dome, which opened its doors to fans in 2024. The arena features a unique wall of stands on one end.
An interesting wrinkle: Steve Ballmer’s Clippers are currently under investigation by the NBA for allegedly circumventing the salary cap. Kawhi Leonard, whose alleged no-show job at Ballmer-funded Aspiration is central to the investigation, is an All-Star this season.
The rosters, as selected by conference, in alphabetical order:
|
EASTERN CONFERENCE |
WESTERN CONFERENCE |
|
Giannis Antetokounmpo, Milwaukee Bucks |
Deni Avdija, Portland Trail Blazers |
|
Scottie Barnes, Toronto Raptors |
Devin Booker, Phoenix Suns |
|
Jaylen Brown, Boston Celtics |
Stephen Curry, Golden State Warriors |
|
Jalen Brunson, New York Knicks |
Kevin Durant, Houston Rockets |
|
Cade Cunningham, Detroit Pistons |
Luka Dončić, Los Angeles Lakers |
|
Jalen Duren, Detroit Pistons |
Anthony Edwards, Minnesota Timberwolves |
|
Brandon Ingram, Toronto Raptors* |
Shai Gileous-Alexander, Oklahoma City Thunder |
|
Jalen Johnson, Atlanta Hawks |
Chet Holmgren, Oklahoma City Thunder |
|
Tyrese Maxey, Philadelphia 76ers |
LeBron James, Los Angeles Lakers |
|
Donovan Mitchell, Cleveland Cavaliers |
Nikola Jokić, Denver Nuggets |
|
Norman Powell, Miami Heat |
Kawhi Leonard, Los Angeles Clippers* |
|
Pascal Siakam, Indiana Pacers |
Jamal Murray, Denver Nuggets |
|
Karl-Anthony Towns, New York Knicks |
Alperen Şengün, Houston Rockets* |
|
Victor Wembanyama, San Antonio Spurs |
* Alperen Şengün was named as an injury replacement for Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (abdominal strain). Brandon Ingram was named as an injury replacement for Stephen Curry (knee). NBA commissioner Adam Silver also selected Kawhi Leonard to the game in order to balance the rosters under the new USA vs. World format.
The new format will feature a round-robin tournament between three teams — two made up of players from the United States (USA Stars and USA Stripes) and a third consisting of international competitors (Team World). Each roster must include at least eight players.
Because the original 24 All-Star selections resulted in nine international players and 15 from the U.S., the commissioner added Leonard to the U.S. player pool.
Here’s how the teams have been divided for the 2026 All-Star Game:
|
USA STARS |
USA STRIPES |
TEAM WORLD |
|
Scottie Barnes |
Jaylen Brown |
Giannis Antetokounmpo |
|
Devin Booker |
Jalen Brunson |
Deni Avdija |
|
Cade Cunningham |
Kevin Durant |
Luka Dončić |
|
Jalen Duren |
Brandon Ingram |
Nikola Jokić |
|
Anthony Edwards |
LeBron James |
Jamal Murray |
|
Chet Holmgren |
Kawhi Leonard |
Alperen Şengün |
|
Jalen Johnson |
Donovan Mitchell |
Pascal Siakam |
|
Tyrese Maxey |
Norman Powell |
Karl-Anthony Towns |
|
Victor Wembanyama |
Each team will face each other once in the elimination stage:
Game 1: Stars vs. World
Game 2: Stripes vs. Game 1 Winner
Game 3: Stripes vs. Game 1 Loser
Game 4: Championship
The two teams with the best records will advance to the championship game. If all teams finish the round robin with a 1-1 record, the two teams with the highest point differential will play each other for the title.
Each game will be 12 minutes.
In last year’s All-Star Game round-robin tournament, each member of the winning team received $125,000 and each member of the runner-up team received $50,000.
The All-Star Game was once held between teams from the Eastern and Western conferences, facing each other in what looked a lot like an NBA game — four 12-minute quarters and intense competition among the greatest basketball players in the world.
Somewhere along the way, most likely as parties and corporate sponsorships took greater priority throughout the weekend, the players stopped caring as much about competition.
As players took the game less seriously, scores for the first time soared into the 190s in 2016 and 2017, and in 2018 the NBA changed its All-Star Game format for the first time.
For six years, the NBA named two captains who selected their 12-man teams from the 24-player field. That stretch featured a number of wrinkles, including an Elam Ending and a playground-style draft, each meant to inspire more competition among the players, and each failing most every year.
2018: Team LeBron 148, Team Stephen 145
2019: Team LeBron 178, Team Giannis 164
2020: Team LeBron 157, Team Giannis 155
2021: Team LeBron 170, Team Durant 150
2022: Team LeBron 163, Team Durant 160
2023: Team Giannis 184, Team LeBron 175
The January 2020 death of four-time All-Star Game MVP Kobe Bryant, who epitomized effort across 18 appearances in the exhibition, did inspire an uptick in intensity that year, when a team captained by LeBron defeated one captained by Antetokounmpo 157-155.
The resurrection of the All-Star Game was short-lived, however, and in 2024 Silver reverted to the East vs. West format. It did not go well, as the East beat the West 211-186.
So, Silver instituted a just-as-confusing round-robin tournament last year, featuring three teams of All-Stars and a fourth of Rising Stars, and that, obviously, did not go well, either (Shaq’s OG’s beat Chuck’s Global Stars 41-25).
Rather than scrap the game entirely, ending what was once one of its signature events, Silver made another effort to inspire the same from the players in this confounding USA vs. World round-robin format.
The only thing that will truly change the level of competition is care from the players, who are more incentivized to remain healthy for the teams that pay them millions. If — and that’s a big if — the new format inspires increased competition from players who want to represent their countries, much like the Olympics elicits effort, bring it on.
Tanking in the NBA is getting out of hand. ]
Plenty of half-measures have been floated over the years — wins-based odds, multi-year standings formulas, tournaments for lottery teams — but every one of them still ties record to draft position, which means every one of them can be gamed.
Is tanking inevitable? What if you could design a system that completely severs the link between losing and draft position? Here’s an idea: I call it the Lottery Wheel.
The premise is simple: remove a team’s record from the draft equation entirely. Use predetermined lottery odds assigned years in advance to every team. Those odds rotate annually. This system retains randomness through a lottery draw, and those odds would remain tradable, which would create an entirely new market for teams to rebuild without needing to lose on purpose.
The Lottery Wheel works by dividing the NBA’s 30 teams into five tiers of six teams each. Every tier is assigned a percentage of the total lottery odds, and those odds are distributed equally among the six teams within that tier.
All 30 teams would be eligible for the lottery, not just the 14 teams that miss the playoffs. Why? Because if only non-playoff teams are eligible, you recreate a tanking incentive at the margins. Under any 14-team lottery in which all playoff teams are excluded, a team on the bubble has a genuine reason to lose its way out of the playoffs to retain lottery position.
Before the system launches, the NBA would seed every team into its starting position on the wheel based on cumulative record, with the worst teams selecting first. Once every team has its spot, the wheel locks in and rotates automatically.
The tiers would rotate on a five-year cycle, meaning every team passes through every tier exactly once over five years. The rotation is staggered — Tier 1, then Tier 3, then Tier 5, then Tier 2, then Tier 4 — so that no team ever has back-to-back premium years. Everyone knows where they’ll be. Records are irrelevant. Odds are determined solely by which tier the wheel assigned to you that year. There is literally zero incentive to lose.
The NBA’s current lottery implementation talks about odds in the context of 1,000 combinations assigned to teams. For simplicity, the Lottery Wheel could use 600 combinations to evenly distribute odds within each tier:
Tier 1: 40 combinations per team (240 total)
Tier 2: 25 combinations per team (150 total)
Tier 3: 18 combinations per team (108 total)
Tier 4: 11 combinations per team (66 total)
Tier 5: 6 combinations per team (36 total)
A Tier 1 team has roughly a 6.7% chance at the No. 1 pick. That’s the best seat at the table, but it’s less than half of the 14% the current system gives the worst team. Even Tier 5 teams carry a 1% chance, which is comparable to what the 13th-worst team gets under today’s rules. No tier is a dead year.
Every team would receive 40, 25, 18, 11, and six combinations over the five-year cycle. That’s exactly 100 per team. The system is perfectly equitable by design. No franchise is advantaged or disadvantaged over time. The only variable is which years your premium odds fall.
The top six picks are determined by a weighted lottery draw. All 30 teams are in the pool, and their odds are based on their tier assignment, plus whatever odds were acquired via trade. Each pick is drawn individually.
Here’s how those odds look:
Picks seven through 30 are slotted by tier. After the lottery draws the top six, the remaining teams fill in by tier order: all remaining Tier 1 teams go first, then Tier 2, then Tier 3, and so on. Those picks could be determined by randomizing their placement with a mini-lottery, similar to a reform idea presented by Boston Celtics executive Mike Zarren, which helped inspire my first Wheel concept published over a decade ago.
The second round would follow the same tier-based structure for every pick in the round, with placement randomized within each tier.
You might be thinking: A 6.7% chance seems kinda low for Tier 1 teams. True. But because of how slotting works, a Tier 1 team’s floor is the 7-12 range. That’s a lottery pick in today’s system.
Owners of bad teams will ask: “Why would I vote for a system that stops rewarding me for being terrible?” But the Lottery Wheel shifts the rebuilding engine from losing games to winning trades.
Under the current system, teams trade future draft picks. With the Lottery Wheel, odds would also be tradable. And that changes everything. Draft capital would also have a known, quantifiable value attached to it. It turns draft capital into a liquid currency. That’s a fundamentally different rebuilding engine for teams trading away or acquiring odds.
Here’s an example: It’s the 2036 trade deadline. Toronto is at the top of the standings and in its Tier 2 year for the draft. That means Toronto has 25 combinations, a 4.2% shot at the first pick and a 25.2% chance at a top-six pick. In today’s NBA, a contender’s first is usually a pick in the 20s and rarely the centerpiece of a rebuild trade. But under the Lottery Wheel, suddenly a contender’s pick has value. And New Orleans, a non-contender in its Tier 5 year, has a player that Toronto desires. So the Pelicans acquire that pick from the Raptors to increase their odds, and the Raptors get a player to compete for a title.
That’s an approach that doesn’t exist in the current system, and it’s the kind of transaction that would replace tanking as the primary engine of rebuilding.
I’m not going to pretend this system is flawless. It isn’t. Let me address the biggest concerns head-on.
1. Chronically bad teams lose their safety net
This is the most legitimate objection. Under the current system, if you’re terrible for seven straight years, you get seven straight years of great odds. There at least appears to be a path out for terrible teams. Whereas, with the Lottery Wheel, you get one Tier 1 year, and in my proposal those odds are only 6.7%.
“You’re asking bad teams to give up the one thing that makes being bad tolerable,” said an executive who heard my proposal.
Fair point. But the current system doesn’t necessarily help chronically bad teams either. Only one team with under 20 wins (Minnesota in 2020) has actually secured the top overall pick since the rules were changed in 2019. The most common outcome for the teams with the best odds? The fifth pick. This has happened seven times for the 21 teams that have had 14% odds. In other words, the NBA has already effectively removed the safety net. And unlike today, a bad team doesn’t have to stay bad to improve its position. It can acquire better odds through trades at any point in the cycle, or simply get lucky in any given year. Even Tier 5 teams have a shot at the top six.
2. A contender could win the first pick
Yup. It’s possible. But that’s already possible under the current system, with the Thunder holding the rights to an unprotected first courtesy of the Clippers. In 2017, we saw the Celtics land the first pick with a pick they acquired from the Nets.
The lottery is inherently unpredictable. And so is the draft. Great players can be found anywhere. The Lottery Wheel makes it more of a regular thing for good teams to get high picks, but the question is whether it’s better for randomness to exist within a system that incentivizes winning or one that incentivizes losing. If the price of eliminating tanking is that sometimes a great team lucks into a great player, that’s a price worth paying.
The modern day draft is no longer “compensation for being bad.” It’s simply how new talent enters the league. But losing is still rewarded because of the probability of moving up. That needs to change. And if a contender landing in Tier 1 feels like too much of an advantage — between the lottery odds and the guaranteed slotting floor of picks seven through 12 — the league could simply expand the weighted draw beyond six picks to soften that edge.
3. The known draft class problem
Everyone in the basketball world has a rough sense of which draft classes are loaded three to four years out. It’s not an exact science, of course. But a team whose Tier 1 year falls in a weak class gets unlucky through no fault of its own.
This was one of the classic criticisms of the Zarren “wheel” idea: If teams know in advance when they’ll be positioned well, elite prospects can time their draft entry to land in preferred situations. With modern NIL and two-year college stays on the horizon, that dynamic becomes even more plausible.
4. Expansion breaks the math
The NBA is almost certainly expanding to 32 teams at some point in the 2030s. Thirty divides cleanly into five tiers of six, but 32 doesn’t. The league would need to adjust to either four tiers of eight, or vice versa, or have tiers with uneven group sizes.
5. Some teams are still going to stink
Even if draft incentive disappears, teams will still protect assets with load management and minutes limits, and still prioritize development over short-term wins, and still make financially motivated choices by ducking the tax and dumping salaries. So yes, the Lottery Wheel removes draft-driven tanking, but it does not magically create 30 teams playing like it’s Game 7 every night.
Every one of those problems is an edge case, an optics concern, or something patchable with rules tweaks. But the numbers and percentages are adjustable. The structure is the point. The core mechanic is simple: Your record has nothing to do with your draft position.
Realistically, a system like this couldn’t take effect until the 2030s. Teams have already traded picks over the next seven years under the existing rules. This is around the time when expansion is expected. Restructuring the draft alongside expansion would give the league a natural window to start from scratch with enormous benefits.
With all 30 teams in the pool, you’d see teams on the playoff bubble like the Bucks, Bulls, Grizzlies and Mavericks all still competing for a spot this year if their odds weren’t tied to being in the lottery.
More games would have meaning, making the regular season matter more. You would not see teams throwing out idiotic lineups or coaches installing bad game plans meant to increase their chances of losing. Instead, the focus shifts to winning games and developing players.
The Lottery Wheel also changes the conversation around resting players. The league’s player participation policy would still exist since stars should play in marquee games. But the league would no longer have to guess whether a team is resting a player or tanking. That suspicion disappears. This is important not just for optics but for the genuine integrity of the league. The NBA has fully embraced sports betting and is making money off fans betting on games. Games that some teams are intentionally losing. The league can’t partner with sportsbooks and profit off fan engagement while allowing teams to deliberately lose.
The on-court product improves, and so does the off-court spectacle. This is a bigger, better TV product than the current four-pick drawing involving only non-playoff teams. With the Lottery Wheel system, every fan base in the league is watching because their team has skin in the game. Drawing only the top six picks keeps the truly franchise-altering picks subject to chance, while letting the tier structure do its work from pick seven onward.
No system is perfect. The Lottery Wheel has edge cases and implementation questions that would need to be worked through. But the question facing the NBA isn’t whether a new system would be flawless. It’s whether it would be better than what we have.
Fans are paying the price. Buying tickets days in advance is a gamble when you don’t know if the stars you’re paying to see will actually play. The league knows this is an issue, which is one reason why it created the NBA Cup (to give the early part of the season more meaning) and the play-in tournament (to make the playoffs more attainable for more teams). The NBA is an entertainment product, and it’s not just competing with other sports leagues anymore. It’s competing with everything: Netflix, YouTube, every other piece of content fighting for attention. The games need to matter.
The league’s open-mindedness for experimentation to improve that product is admirable. But the flattened odds have failed at influencing teams to care more about putting the best team on the floor every night of the long season. Nine teams are tanking before the All-Star break. Others will join them in the weeks ahead. The problem isn’t going away. The league needs to stop tinkering and start reimagining.
“You won’t see that this year,” Jazz general manager Austin Ainge said in June when asked about Utah’s tanking approach. He lied. And until the NBA stops rewarding teams for losing, they all will.
The NBA announced punishments stemming from the brawl during the Detroit Pistons and Charlotte Hornets game on Monday night, when four players were ejected from the game.
The punishments are as follows:
Isaiah Stewart: 7 games
Miles Bridges: 4 games
Moussa Diabate: 4 games
Jalen Duren: 2 games
Stewart received a harsher punishment because he left the bench to get involved and because of his history of infractions.
Multiple skirmishes happened during Monday’s game. The first involved Diabate and Duren, when the former fouled Duren. The two exchanged words before Duren shoved Diabate in his face. Diabate then charged at Duren, and things escalated from there before the scuffle was broken up.
BENCHES CLEAR IN PISTONS-HORNETS 😲
Moussa Diabate, Miles Bridges, Jalen Duren and Isaiah Stewart were all ejected following the altercation during Pistons-Hornets. pic.twitter.com/VeNSi6vEBR
— ESPN (@espn) February 10, 2026
Then, Bridges charged at Duren and threw a punch, and Stewart left the bench to join the scuffle. After referee review, the four players, plus Hornets coach Charles Lee, were ejected from the game.
Detroit currently holds the top spot in the Eastern Conference at 39-13 and has the second-best record in the NBA. Duren has become a key part of what’s been built in Detroit as the team’s starting center. He’s averaging 17.7 points and 10.4 rebounds per game and has been a consistent double-double performer. Duren will reportedly still be permitted to play in this weekend’s All-Star Game.
As the backup center, Stewart is the player who does the dirty work in Detroit. That includes getting into scuffles and even full-blown fights, which is why he’ll miss the next seven games. While Stewart isn’t one of the team’s stars, his role is important, and the Pistons will miss his contributions of 10 points and five rebounds per game while he’s out.
For Charlotte, these suspensions come as the Hornets battle for the final play-in spot in the East. At 25-29, with a one-game lead over 11th-place Chicago, Charlotte cannot afford to miss any key contributors right now, especially Bridges, who averages 18.2 points and 6.1 rebounds per game. Diabate is the team’s leading rebounder, grabbing 8.6 per game.
Each player was also fined by the NBA alongside the suspensions.
Fine amounts:
Isaiah Stewart: $724,138
Miles Bridges: $689,655
Jalen Duren: $89,423
Moussa Diabte: $62,641
Arizona Diamondbacks outfielder Corbin Carroll will reportedly miss the World Baseball Classic and is in danger of missing Opening Day due to a broken hamate bone in his right hand, according to ESPN’s Jeff Passan.
The 25-year-old Carroll reportedly sustained the injury during batting practice Tuesday.
News: Arizona Diamondbacks star outfielder Corbin Carroll broke the hamate bone in his right hand and is undergoing surgery today, sources tell ESPN. He will miss the World Baseball Classic and his ability to play Opening Day is now in question.
— Jeff Passan (@JeffPassan) February 11, 2026
Carroll wasn’t the only player to sustain a hamate bone injury Tuesday. Baltimore Orioles infielder Jackson Holliday will also miss time this season due to the same injury.
Carroll’s injury comes as a massive blow to both Team USA and the Diamondbacks. He was likely to be one of Team USA’s starting outfielders in the World Baseball Classic. With Carroll sidelined, Minnesota Twins star Byron Buxton could be in line for more playing time in the tournament, and Team USA will likely add another outfielder to its roster as Carroll’s replacement.
It’s an even bigger loss for the Diamondbacks, who have gotten two fantastic seasons from Carroll since he made his major-league debut in 2022. After a bit of a down year in 2024, Carroll bounced back with a .259/.343/.541 slash line in 2025. That performance was good enough to send him to his second All-Star Game, win him a Silver Slugger and help him finish sixth in the MVP voting.
While Carroll has battled ailments throughout his career, he has never been at risk of missing significant time due to an injury. He might not miss much time in 2026, either, as the recovery time from hamate bone surgery is roughly four-to-six weeks.
But even if Carroll is able to return by — or shortly after — Opening Day, he could battle lingering effects from the surgery. Players who sustain hamate bone injuries typically take some time to fully recover their power. That could be a significant limitation for Carroll, who hit a career-high 31 home runs last season.
That will also be a concern for Holliday, whom the Orioles have already ruled out for Opening Day. Holliday, 22, doesn’t rely on his power as much, but he could still experience aftereffects from the surgery. Holliday is coming off a season in which he slashed .242/.314/.375 over 649 plate appearances. He was expected to open camp as the team’s starter at second base and likely would’ve been a popular breakout candidate due to his status as the former No. 1 overall prospect.
In addition to those two, New York Mets shortstop Francisco Lindor will also be sidelined in spring training due to a hamate bone injury. Lindor’s injury was reported Tuesday, and he reportedly had surgery on Wednesday. He is still expected to be ready for Opening Day.