Equipment: MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU and SIL2 Process CPU Module
Vulnerability: Incorrect Privilege Assignment
2. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a non-administrator user to disclose the credentials (user ID and password) of a user with a lower access level than themselves.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
Mitsubishi Electric reports that the following MELSEC iQ-R Series products are affected:
MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R08SFCPU: All versions
MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R16SFCPU: All versions
MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R32SFCPU: All versions
MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R120SFCPU: All versions
MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R08PSFCPU: All versions
MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R16PSFCPU: All versions
MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R32PSFCPU: All versions
MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R120PSFCPU: All versions
Information disclosure vulnerability due to incorrect privilege assignment exists in MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU and SIL2 Process CPU modules. After a remote attacker logs into the CPU module as a non-administrator user, the attacker may disclose the credentials (user ID and password) of a user with a lower access level than the attacker by sending a specially crafted packet.
Reid Wightman of Dragos Inc. reported this vulnerability to Mitsubishi Electric.
4. MITIGATIONS
When MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU versions 27 or later is used with GX Works3 versions 1.087R or later, this attack can be prevented by enabling “communicating with only the enhanced version of vulnerability management of GX Works3” when writing user information to the CPU module. Mitsubishi Electric will implement the workaround in other products in the near future. Please contact your local Mitsubishi Electric representative to update your CPU module to the one listed above.
Mitsubishi Electric recommends that users take the following mitigation measures to minimize the risk of exploiting this vulnerability:
Use a firewall or virtual private network (VPN), etc., to prevent unauthorized access when Internet access is required.
Use within a LAN and block access from untrusted networks and hosts through firewalls.
Use IP filter function to block access from untrusted hosts. For details on the IP filter function, please refer to the following manual for each product. “1.13 Security” – “IP filter” in the MELSEC iQ-R Ethernet User’s Manual (Application).
Restrict physical access to the affected product as well as to the personal computers and the network devices that can communicate with it.
Install antivirus software on your personal computer that can access the affected product.
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.
JetBrains released a security advisory to address a vulnerability (CVE-2024-23917) in TeamCity On-Premises. A cyber threat actor could exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to read the credential and device administration keys from a configuration card. Those keys could be used to create malicious configuration cards or credentials.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following HID products are affected:
HID iCLASS SE reader configuration cards: All versions
OMNIKEY Secure Elements reader configuration cards: All versions
HID Global recommends the following mitigations to reduce the risk:
Elite Key and Custom Key customers that have kept their configuration cards secure should continue to be vigilant and restrict access to those cards. To exploit this vulnerability, a reader must be physically close to or in possession of the configuration cards to communicate with the card and extract information.
Administrators should plan to securely destroy unneeded configuration cards.
Customers using the HID standard key, and other customers who are concerned their keys may be compromised should consider steps to update the readers and credentials with new keys. To assist in this effort, HID will be introducing a free upgrade to the Elite Key program. Contact your HID representative for more information at https://www.hidglobal.com/support.
HID has also provided additional steps users can take steps to harden their readers to prevent malicious configuration changes.
iCLASS SE Readers
iCLASS SE Readers using firmware version 8.6.0.4 or higher can use the HID Reader Manager application to prevent the readers from accepting configuration changes from Configuration Cards.
If you need assistance, or if the reader firmware has not been updated to 8.6.0.4 or higher, contact HID Technical Support.
HID OMNIKEY Readers, OMNIKEY Secure Elements, iCLASS SE Reader Modules, iCLASS SE Processors
Contact HID to receive a “Shield Card” that will prevent further configuration changes using reader configuration cards.
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability, such as:
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:CLEAR–Recipients may share this information without restriction. Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:CLEAR information may be shared without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
Summary
Description
CISA received three files for analysis obtained from a critical infrastructure compromised by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber group known as Volt Typhoon.
The submitted files enable discovery and command-and-control (C2): (1) An open source Fast Reverse Proxy Client (FRPC) tool used to open a reverse proxy between the compromised system and a Volt Typhoon C2 server; (2) a Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) that can be used to reveal servers situated behind a network firewall or obscured through Network Address Translation (NAT); and (3) a publicly available port scanner called ScanLine.
This artifact is a cross platform full featured FRP that is written in GO language (Golang) and packed using Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX). This utility can be used to locate servers behind a network firewall or obscured through NAT. It includes the KCP (no acronym) network protocol that allows for error-checked and anonymous delivery of data streams using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) with packet level encryption support.
The program contains two different multiplexer libraries that can bi-directionally stream data over a NAT’d network. It also contains a command line interface (CLI) library that can leverage command shells such as PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and Z Shell (zsh). In addition, the utility features a unique capability that detects if the utility is executed from the command line or by double-clicking.
By default it is configured to connect to the Internet Protocol (IP) address, 203[.]95[.]8[.]98 on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 1080. It must receive a specially formed packet from the C2 for the utility to deploy on the system.
203[.]95[.]8[.]98
Tags
proxy
Ports
1080 TCP
Whois
Domain Name: pdsguam.biz
Registry Domain ID: D15926452-BIZ
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL: whois.godaddy.com
Updated Date: 2023-06-15T04:28:19Z
Creation Date: 2007-01-10T00:40:37Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2024-01-09T23:59:59Z
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 146
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505
Registrant Organization: Domains By Proxy, LLC
Registrant State/Province: Arizona
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Admin Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Tech Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Name Server: ns.pdsguam.biz
Name Server: ns2.pdsguam.biz
DNSSEC: unsigned
This artifact is a command-line port scanning utility from Foundstone, Inc. called ScanLine, which is packed using UPX. It is used to scan for open UDP and TCP ports, grab banners from open ports, resolve IP addresses to host names, and bind to specified ports and IP addresses.
Screenshots
Figure 1 – Usage and syntax for the ScanLine utility.
This artifact is a 64-bit Windows executable file that is packed using UPX. This packed file contains a compiled version of an open-source tool published on GitHub called “FRPC”. The “FRPC” is a command-line tool written in Golang that is designed to open a reverse proxy between the compromised system and the TA’s C2 server.
When the “FRPC” is installed and executed on the compromised system, it attempts to establish a connection with the Fast Reverse Proxy Server (FRPS) using the reverse proxy method to allow the TA to control the compromised system. This “FRPC” application supports encryption, compression, and allows easy token authentication. It also supports the protocols below:
–Begin protocols–
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
An alternative Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
An alternative Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)
–End protocols–
Displayed below is the “FRPC” tool configuration that contains the network communication method, the remote “FRPS” server’s public Internet Protocol (IP) address and port numbers:
Displayed below are the command-line usages and flags of the “FRPC” tool:
–Begin usages and flags–
Usage:
frpc [flags]
frpc [command]
Available Commands:
help Help about any command
tcp Run frpc with a single tcp proxy
udp Run frpc with a single udp proxy
verify Verify that the configures is valid
Flags:
-c, –config string config file of frpc (default “./frpc.ini”)
-h, –help help for frpc
-v, –version version of frpc
Use “frpc [command] –help” for more information about a command.
——————————————————————————————–
Run frpc with a single tcp proxy
Usage:
frpc tcp [flags]
Flags:
–disable_log_color disable log color in console
-h, –help help for tcp
-i, –local_ip string local ip (default “127.0.0.1”)
-l, –local_port int local port
–log_file string console or file path (default “console”)
–log_level string log level (default “info”)
–log_max_days int log file reversed days (default 3)
-p, –protocol string tcp or kcp or websocket (default “tcp”)
-n, –proxy_name string proxy name
-r, –remote_port int remote port
-s, –server_addr string frp server’s address (default “127.0.0.1:7000”)
–tls_enable enable frpc tls
-t, –token string auth token
–uc use compression
–ue use encryption
-u, –user string user
Global Flags:
-c, –config string config file of frpc (default “./frpc.ini”)
-v, –version version of frpc
——————————————————————————————————————-
Run frpc with a single udp proxy
Usage:
frpc udp [flags]
Flags:
–disable_log_color disable log color in console
-h, –help help for udp
-i, –local_ip string local ip (default “127.0.0.1”)
-l, –local_port int local port
–log_file string console or file path (default “console”)
–log_level string log level (default “info”)
–log_max_days int log file reversed days (default 3)
-p, –protocol string tcp or kcp or websocket (default “tcp”)
-n, –proxy_name string proxy name
-r, –remote_port int remote port
-s, –server_addr string frp server’s address (default “127.0.0.1:7000”)
–tls_enable enable frpc tls
-t, –token string auth token
–uc use compression
–ue use encryption
-u, –user string user
Global Flags:
-c, –config string config file of frpc (default “./frpc.ini”)
-v, –version version of frpc
—————————————————————————————————————————-
Verify that the configures is valid
Usage:
frpc verify [flags]
Flags:
-h, –help help for verify
Global Flags:
-c, –config string config file of frpc (default “./frpc.ini”)
-v, –version version of frpc
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/
Document FAQ
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.
The following federal agencies and international organizations are additional co-authors on the joint advisory and guidance:
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD’s) Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC)
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) a part of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
Volt Typhoon actors are seeking to pre-position themselves—using living off the land (LOTL) techniques—on IT networks for disruptive or destructive cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States. The advisory provides actionable information from U.S. incident response activity that can help all organizations:
Recognize Volt Typhoon techniques,
Assess whether Volt Typhoon techniques have compromised your organization,
Secure your networks from these adversarial techniques by implementing recommended mitigations.
To supplement the advisory, the Joint Guidance provides threat detection information and mitigations applicable to LOTL activity, regardless of threat actor. Additionally, CISA has published Secure by Design Alert: Security Design Improvements for SOHO Device Manufacturers, which provides technology manufactures guidance on protecting their products from Volt Typhoon compromises.
CISA and its partners strongly urge critical infrastructure organizations and technology manufacturers to read the joint advisory and guidance to defend against this threat. For more information on People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actors, visit People’s Republic of China Cyber Threat. To learn more about secure by design principles and practices, visit Secure by Design.
VMware released a security advisory to address multiple vulnerabilities in Aria Operations for Networks. A cyber threat actor could exploit one of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system.
CISA encourages users and administrators to review VMware security advisory VMSA-2024-0002 and apply the necessary updates.
