Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability exists that could cause local attackers being able to exploit these issues to potentially execute arbitrary code while the end user opens a malicious project file (SSD file) provided by the attacker.
Michael Heinzl reported this vulnerability to Schneider Electric. Schneider Electric reported this vulnerability to CISA.
4. MITIGATIONS
Schneider Electric recommends users take the following actions:
Update to Version v2.8.1 FR of EcoStruxure Power Build-Rapsody, which includes a fix for this vulnerability. Reboot after installing the new version.
Additionally, Schneider Electric recommends that if users choose not to apply the remediation provided above, the following mitigations should be applied immediately to reduce the risk of exploitation:
Store the project files in a secure storage and restrict access to only trusted users.
When exchanging files over the network, use secure communication protocols.
Encrypt project files when stored.
Only open project files received from trusted sources.
Compute a hash of the project files and regularly check the consistency of this hash to verify the integrity before usage.
Harden the workstation running EcoStruxure™ Power Build Rapsody.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
5. UPDATE HISTORY
June 3, 2025: Initial Republication of Schneider Electric SEVD-2025-133-03
Souvik Kandar of MicroSec (microsec.io) reported this vulnerability to CISA.
4. MITIGATIONS
Instantel is actively working on a firmware update to address this vulnerability. In the meantime, Micromate users are advised to implement the following workaround measures:
Establish and maintain a list of approved IP addresses that are allowed to access the modem. This measure will help prevent unauthorized access.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.
Vulnerabilities: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default, Use of Hard-coded Credentials
2. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to gain high-level access to and remotely operate the device, potentially putting it into a non-functional state.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following Consilium Safety product is affected:
The CS5000 Fire Panel is vulnerable due to a default account that exists on the panel. Even though it is possible to change this by SSHing into the device, it has remained unchanged on every installed system observed. This account is not root but holds high-level permissions that could severely impact the device’s operation if exploited.
The CS5000 Fire Panel is vulnerable due to a hard-coded password that runs on a VNC server and is visible as a string in the binary responsible for running VNC. This password cannot be altered, allowing anyone with knowledge of it to gain remote access to the panel. Such access could enable an attacker to operate the panel remotely, potentially putting the fire panel into a non-functional state and causing serious safety issues.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Commercial Facilities, Energy, Government Services and Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Transportation Systems
COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Sweden
3.4 RESEARCHER
Andrew Tierney of Pen Test Partners reported these vulnerabilities to CISA.
4. MITIGATIONS
Consilium Safety is aware of these vulnerabilities. Currently, no fixes are planned for the CS5000 Fire Panel.
Users wanting enhanced security features are advised to upgrade to Consilium Safety’s newer line of fire panels. Specifically, products manufactured after July 1, 2024, incorporate more secure-by-design principles.
Users of the CS5000 Fire Panel are recommended to implement compensating countermeasures, such as physical security and access control restrictions for dedicated personnel.
More product safety information can be found on Consilium Safety’s support webpage.
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities, such as:
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.
Affected server applications contain an out of bounds read past the end of an allocated buffer while checking the integrity of incoming packets. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to create a denial of service condition.
Airbus Security reported this vulnerability to Siemens. Siemens reported this vulnerability to CISA.
4. MITIGATIONS
Siemens has identified the following specific workarounds and mitigations users can apply to reduce risk:
SiPass integrated: Update to V2.95.3.18 or later version
As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize VPNs may have vulnerabilities, should be updated to the most recent version available, and are only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
Lantronix Device installer is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks in configuration files read from the network device. An attacker could obtain credentials, access these network devices, and modify their configurations. An attacker may also gain access to the host running the Device Installer software or the password hash of the user running the application.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Information Technology
COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: United States
3.4 RESEARCHER
Robert McLellan reported this vulnerability to CISA.
4. MITIGATIONS
Lantronix indicates its Device Installer product has reached its end of support lifecycle in 2018. It will not receive any additional updates or security enhancements. For your security, Lantronix advises migrating to a supported solution Lantronix Provisioning Manager as soon as possible. Using unsupported software is at user’s own discretion and may leave user systems vulnerable to security issues.
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability such as:
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as virtual private networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
Do not click web links or open attachments in unsolicited email messages.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability has a high attack complexity.
Affected Vertiv products contain a stack based buffer overflow vulnerability. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain code execution on the device.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.
This advisory details a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage-oriented campaign targeting technology companies and logistics entities, including those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine.
Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center, military unit 26165 cyber actors are using a mix of previously disclosed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and are likely connected to these actors’ widescale targeting of IP cameras in Ukraine and bordering NATO nations.
Executives and network defenders at logistics entities and technology companies should recognize the elevated threat of until 26165 targeting, increase monitoring and threat hunting for known TTPs and indicators of compromise, and posture network defenses with a presumption of targeting. For more information on Russian state-sponsored threat actor activity, see CISA’s Russia Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories page.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint advisory to disseminate known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with threat actors deploying the LummaC2 information stealer (infostealer) malware. LummaC2 malware is able to infiltrate victim computer networks and exfiltrate sensitive information, threatening vulnerable individuals’ and organizations’ computer networks across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. According to FBI information and trusted third-party reporting, this activity has been observed as recently as May 2025. The IOCs included in this advisory were associated with LummaC2 malware infections from November 2023 through May 2025.
The FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of LummaC2 malware.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 17. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for threat actor activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.
Overview
LummaC2 malware first appeared for sale on multiple Russian-language speaking cybercriminal forums in 2022. Threat actors frequently use spearphishing hyperlinks and attachments to deploy LummaC2 malware payloads [T1566.001, T1566.002]. Additionally, threat actors rely on unsuspecting users to execute the payload by clicking a fake Completely Automated Public Turing Test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA). The CAPTCHA contains instructions for users to then open the Windows Run window (Windows Button + R) and paste clipboard contents (“CTRL + V”). After users press “enter” a subsequent Base64-encoded PowerShell process is executed.
To obfuscate their operations, threat actors have embedded and distributed LummaC2 malware within spoofed or fake popular software (i.e., multimedia player or utility software) [T1036]. The malware’s obfuscation methods allow LummaC2 actors to bypass standard cybersecurity measures, such as Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions or antivirus programs, designed to flag common phishing attempts or drive-by downloads [T1027].
Once a victim’s computer system is infected, the malware can exfiltrate sensitive user information, including personally identifiable information, financial credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, and multifactor authentication (MFA) details without immediate detection [TA0010, T1119]. Private sector statistics indicate there were more than 21,000 market listings selling LummaC2 logs on multiple cybercriminal forums from April through June of 2024, a 71.7 percent increase from April through June of 2023.
File Execution
Upon execution, the LummaC2.exe file will enter its main routine, which includes four sub-routines (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. LummaC2 Main Routine
The first routine decrypts strings for a message box that is displayed to the user (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Message Box
If the user selects No, the malware will exit. If the user selects Yes, the malware will move on to its next routine, which decrypts its callback Command and Control (C2) domains [T1140]. A list of observed domains is included in the Indicators of Compromise section.
After each domain is decoded, the implant will attempt a POST request [T1071.001] (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Post Request
If the POST request is successful, a pointer to the decoded domain string is saved in a global variable for later use in the main C2 routine used to retrieve JSON formatted commands (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Code Saving Successful Callback Request
Once a valid C2 domain is contacted and saved, the malware moves on to the next routine, which queries the user’s name and computer name utilizing the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) GetUserNameW and GetComputerNameW respectively [T1012]. The returned data is then hashed and compared against a hard-coded hash value (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. User and Computer Name Check
The hashing routine was not identified as a standard algorithm; however, it is a simple routine that converts a Unicode string to a 32-bit hexadecimal value.
If the username hash is equal to the value 0x56CF7626, then the computer name is queried. If the computer name queried is seven characters long, then the name is hashed and checked against the hard-coded value of 0xB09406C7. If both values match, a final subroutine will be called with a static value of the computer name hash as an argument. If this routine is reached, the process will terminate. This is most likely a failsafe to prevent the malware from running on the attacker’s system, as its algorithms are one-way only and will not reveal information on the details of the attacker’s own hostname and username.
If the username and hostname check function returns zero (does not match the hard-coded values), the malware will enter its main callback routine. The LummaC2 malware will contact the saved hostname from the previous check and send the following POST request (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Second POST Request
The data returned from the C2 server is encrypted. Once decoded, the C2 data is in a JSON format and is parsed by the LummaC2 malware. The C2 uses the JSON configuration to parse its browser extensions and target lists using the ex key, which contains an array of objects (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. Parsing of ex JSON Value
Parsing the c key contains an array of objects, which will give the implant its C2 (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Parsing of c JSON Value
C2 Instructions
Each array object that contains the JSON key value of t will be evaluated as a command opcode, resulting in the C2 instructions in the subsections below.
1. Opcode 0 – Steal Data Generic
This command allows five fields to be defined when stealing data, offering the most flexibility. The Opcode O command option allows LummaC2 affiliates to add their custom information gathering details (see Table 1).
Table 2. Opcode 1 Options
Key
Value
p
Path to steal from
m
File extensions to read
z
Output directory to store stolen data
d
Depth of recursiveness
fs
Maximum file size
2. Opcode 1 – Steal Browser Data
This command only allows for two options: a path and the name of the output directory. This command, based on sample configuration downloads, is used for browser data theft for everything except Mozilla [T1217] (see Table 2).
Table 2. Opcode 1 Options
Key
Value
p
Path to steal from
z
Name of Browser – Output
3. Opcode 2 – Steal Browser Data (Mozilla)
This command is identical to Opcode 1; however, this option seems to be utilized solely for Mozilla browser data (see Table 3).
Table 3. Opcode 2 Options
Key
Value
p
Path to steal from
z
Name of Browser – Output
4. Opcode 3 – Download a File
This command contains three options: a URL, file extension, and execution type. The configuration can specify a remote file with u to download and create the extension specified in the ft key [T1105] (see Table 4).
Table 4. Opcode 3 Options
Key
Value
u
URL for Download
ft
File Extension
e
Execution Type
The e value can take two values: 0 or 1. This specifies how to execute the downloaded file either with the LoadLibrary API or via the command line with rundll32.exe [T1106] (see Table 5).
Table 5. Execution Types
Key
Value
e=0
Execute with LoadLibraryW()
e=1
Executive with rund1132.exe
5. Take Screenshot
If the configuration JSON file has a key of “se” and its value is “true,” the malware will take a screenshot in BMP format and upload it to the C2 server.
6. Delete Self
If the configuration JSON file has a key of “ad” and its value is “true,” the malware will enter a routine to delete itself.
The command shown in Figure 9 will be decoded and executed for self-deletion.
Figure 9. Self-Deletion Command Line
Figure 10 depicts the above command line during execution.
Figure 10. Decoded Command Line in Memory
Host Modifications
Without any C2 interactions, the LummaC2 malware does not create any files on the infected drive. It simply runs in memory, gathers system information, and exfiltrates it to the C2 server [T1082]. The commands returned from the C2 server could indicate that it drops additional files and/or saves data to files on the local hard drive. This is variable, as these commands come from the C2 server and are mutable.
Decrypted Strings
Below is a list of hard-coded decrypted strings located in the binary (see Figure 11).
Figure 11. Decoded Strings
Indicators of Compromise
See Table 6 and Table 7 for LummaC2 IOCs obtained by the FBI and trusted third parties.
Disclaimer: The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate and vet these indicators of compromise prior to taking action, such as blocking.
Table 6. LummaC2 Executable Hashes
Executables
Type
4AFDC05708B8B39C82E60ABE3ACE55DB (LummaC2.exe from November 2023)
MD5
E05DF8EE759E2C955ACC8D8A47A08F42 (LummaC2.exe from November 2023)
MD5
C7610AE28655D6C1BCE88B5D09624FEF
MD5
1239288A5876C09D9F0A67BCFD645735168A7C80 (LummaC2.exe from November 2023)
SHA1
B66DA4280C6D72ADCC68330F6BD793DF56A853CB (LummaC2.exe from November 2023)
The following are domains observed deploying LummaC2 malware.
Disclaimer: The domains below are historical in nature and may not currently be malicious.
Pinkipinevazzey[.]pw
Fragnantbui[.]shop
Medicinebuckerrysa[.]pw
Musicallyageop[.]pw
stogeneratmns[.]shop
wallkedsleeoi[.]shop
Tirechinecarpet[.]pw
reinforcenh[.]shop
reliabledmwqj[.]shop
Musclefarelongea[.]pw
Forbidstow[.]site
gutterydhowi[.]shop
Fanlumpactiras[.]pw
Computeryrati[.]site
Contemteny[.]site
Ownerbuffersuperw[.]pw
Seallysl[.]site
Dilemmadu[.]site
Freckletropsao[.]pw
Opposezmny[.]site
Faulteyotk[.]site
Hemispheredodnkkl[.]pw
Goalyfeastz[.]site
Authorizev[.]site
ghostreedmnu[.]shop
Servicedny[.]site
blast-hubs[.]com
offensivedzvju[.]shop
friendseforever[.]help
blastikcn[.]com
vozmeatillu[.]shop
shiningrstars[.]help
penetratebatt[.]pw
drawzhotdog[.]shop
mercharena[.]biz
pasteflawwed[.]world
generalmills[.]pro
citywand[.]live
hoyoverse[.]blog
nestlecompany[.]pro
esccapewz[.]run
dsfljsdfjewf[.]info
naturewsounds[.]help
travewlio[.]shop
decreaserid[.]world
stormlegue[.]com
touvrlane[.]bet
governoagoal[.]pw
paleboreei[.]biz
calmingtefxtures[.]run
foresctwhispers[.]top
tracnquilforest[.]life
sighbtseeing[.]shop
advennture[.]top
collapimga[.]fun
holidamyup[.]today
pepperiop[.]digital
seizedsentec[.]online
triplooqp[.]world
easyfwdr[.]digital
strawpeasaen[.]fun
xayfarer[.]live
jrxsafer[.]top
quietswtreams[.]life
oreheatq[.]live
plantainklj[.]run
starrynsightsky[.]icu
castmaxw[.]run
puerrogfh[.]live
earthsymphzony[.]today
weldorae[.]digital
quavabvc[.]top
citydisco[.]bet
steelixr[.]live
furthert[.]run
featureccus[.]shop
smeltingt[.]run
targett[.]top
mrodularmall[.]top
ferromny[.]digital
ywmedici[.]top
jowinjoinery[.]icu
rodformi[.]run
legenassedk[.]top
htardwarehu[.]icu
metalsyo[.]digital
ironloxp[.]live
cjlaspcorne[.]icu
navstarx[.]shop
bugildbett[.]top
latchclan[.]shop
spacedbv[.]world
starcloc[.]bet
rambutanvcx[.]run
galxnetb[.]today
pomelohgj[.]top
scenarisacri[.]top
jawdedmirror[.]run
changeaie[.]top
lonfgshadow[.]live
liftally[.]top
nighetwhisper[.]top
salaccgfa[.]top
zestmodp[.]top
owlflright[.]digital
clarmodq[.]top
piratetwrath[.]run
hemispherexz[.]top
quilltayle[.]live
equatorf[.]run
latitudert[.]live
longitudde[.]digital
climatologfy[.]top
starofliught[.]top
MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques
See Table 8 through Table 13 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Threat actors used LummaC2 malware to exfiltrate sensitive user information, including traditional credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, and MFA details without immediate detection.
Threat actors used LummaC2 malware to download files with native OS APIs.
Mitigations
The FBI and CISA recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to reduce the risk of compromise by LummaC2 malware. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections. These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations.
Separate User and Privileged Accounts: Allow only necessary users and applications access to the registry [CPG 2.E].
Monitor and detect suspicious behavior during exploitation [CPG 3.A].
Monitor and detect suspicious behavior, creation and termination events, and unusual and unexpected processes running.
Monitor API calls that may attempt to retrieve system information.
Analyze behavior patterns from process activities to identify anomalies.
Implement application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
Log Collection: Regularly monitoring and reviewing registry changes and access logs can support detection of LummaC2 malware [CPG 2.T].
Implement authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) systems [M1018] to limit actions users can perform and review logs of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. Apply principles of least privilege to user accounts and groups, allowing only the performance of authorized actions.
Audit user accounts and revoke credentials for departing employees, removing those that are inactive or unnecessary on a routine basis [CPG 2.D]. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts.
Keep systems up to date with regular updates, patches, hot fixes, and service packs that may minimize vulnerabilities. Learn more by visiting CISA’s webpage: Secure our World Update Software.
Secure network devices to restrict command line access.
Use segmentation to prevent access to sensitive systems and information, possibly with the use of Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate systems [CPG 2.F].
Monitor and detect API usage, looking for unusual or malicious behavior.
Validate Security Controls
In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI and CISA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The FBI and CISA recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess performance against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 8 through Table 13).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The FBI and CISA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
Reporting
Your organization has no obligation to respond or provide information to the FBI in response to this joint advisory. If, after reviewing the information provided, your organization decides to provide information to the FBI, reporting must be consistent with applicable state and federal laws.
The FBI is interested in any information that can be shared, to include the status and scope of infection, estimated loss, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, and host- and network-based indicators.
To report information, please contact the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), your local FBI field office, or CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
Disclaimer
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favor by the FBI and CISA.
