SUMMARY

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) conducted an incident response assessment of a state government organization’s network environment after documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. Analysis confirmed that an unidentified threat actor compromised network administrator credentials through the account of a former employee—a technique commonly leveraged by threat actors—to successfully authenticate to an internal virtual private network (VPN) access point, further navigate the victim’s on-premises environment, and execute various lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) queries against a domain controller.[1] Analysis also focused on the victim’s Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data, as well as the compromised on-premises environment. Analysis determined there were no indications the threat actor further compromised the organization by moving laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure environment.

CISA and MS-ISAC are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide network defenders with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the threat actor and methods to protect against similar exploitation of both unnecessary and privileged accounts.

Download the PDF version of this report:

TECHNICAL DETAILS

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actor’s activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Overview

A state government organization was notified that documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. After further investigation, the victim organization determined that the documents were accessed via the compromised account of a former employee. Threat actors commonly leverage valid accounts, including accounts of former employees that have not been properly removed from the Active Directory (AD), to gain access to organizations.[1] CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that an unidentified threat actor likely accessed documents containing host and user information to post on the dark web for profit after gaining access through the account of a former employee.

The scope of this investigation included the victim organization’s on-premises environment, as well as their Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data. Analysis determined the threat actor did not move laterally from the compromised on-premises network to the Azure environment and did not compromise sensitive systems.

Untitled Goose Tool

Incident responders collected Azure and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) logs using CISA’s Untitled Goose Tool—a free tool to help network defenders detect potentially malicious activity in Microsoft Azure, Azure Active Directory (AAD), and Microsoft 365 (M365) environments. CISA developed the Untitled Goose Tool to export and review AAD sign-in and audit logs, M365 unified audit logs (UAL), Azure activity logs, and MDE data. By exporting cloud artifacts, Untitled Goose Tool supports incident response teams with environments that do not ingest logs into a security information and event management (SIEM) tool.

Threat Actor Activity

The logs revealed the threat actor first connected from an unknown virtual machine (VM) to the victim’s on-premises environment via internet protocol (IP) addresses within their internal VPN range. CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that the threat actor connected to the VM through the victim’s VPN [T1133] with the intent to blend in with legitimate traffic to evade detection.

Initial Access: Compromised Domain Accounts

USER1: The threat actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (USER1) [T1078.002] to conduct reconnaissance and discovery activities. The victim organization confirmed that this account was not disabled immediately following the employee’s departure.

• The threat actor likely obtained the USER1 account credentials in a separate data breach due to the credentials appearing in publicly available channels containing leaked account information [T1589.001].
• USER1 had access to two virtualized servers including SharePoint and the workstation of the former employee. The workstation was virtualized from a physical workstation using the Veeam Physical to Virtual (P2V) function within the backup software.

USER2: The threat actor likely obtained the USER2 account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed by USER1 [T1213.002]. The victim confirmed that the administrator credentials for USER2 were stored locally on this server [T1552.001].

• Through connection from the VM, the threat actor authenticated to multiple services [T1021] via the USER1 account, as well as from an additional compromised global domain administrator account (USER2) [T1078.002].

• The threat actor’s use of the USER2 account was impactful due to the access it granted to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD [T1021.007], thus enabling administrative privileges [T1078.004].

Following notification of the dark web posting, the victim organization immediately disabled the USER1 account and took the two virtualized servers associated with the former employee offline. The victim also changed the password for the USER2 account and removed administrator privileges. Neither of the administrative accounts had multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled.

LDAP Queries

Through connection from the VM, the threat actor conducted LDAP queries of the AD, likely using the open source tool AdFind.exe, based on the format of the output. CISA and MS-ISAC assess the threat actor executed the LDAP queries [T1087.002] to collect user, host [T1018], and trust relationship information [T1482]. It is also believed the LDAP queries generated the text files the threat actor posted for sale on the dark web brokerage site: ad_users.txt, ad_computers.txt, and trustdmp.txt.

Table 1 lists all queries that were conducted between 08:39:43-08:40:56 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

Table 1: LDAP Queries Conducted by the Threat Actor

Query	Description
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)	Collects names and metadata of users in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Computer,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)	Collects names and metadata of hosts in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Trusted-Domain,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)	Collects trust information in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: DC=[REDACTED],DC=local, Search Filter: ( &  ( &  (sAMAccountType=805306368)  (servicePrincipalName=*) ( ! (sAMAccountName=krbtgt) ) ( !  (userAccountControl&2) ) )  (adminCount=1) )	Collects Domain Administrators and Service Principals in the domain.

Service Authentication

Through the VM connection, the threat actor was observed authenticating to various services on the victim organization’s network from the USER1 and USER2 administrative accounts. In all instances, the threat actor authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints [T1078.002],[T1021.002]—a protocol used for providing shared access to files and printers between machines on the network. This was likely used for file, folder, and directory discovery [T1083], and assessed to be executed in an automated manner.

• USER1 authenticated to four services, presumably for the purpose of network and service discovery [T1046].
• USER2 authenticated to twelve services. Note: This account had administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.

MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

See Tables 2-9 for all referenced threat actor’s tactics and techniques for enterprise environments in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Table 2: Reconnaissance

Technique Title	ID	Use
Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials	T1589.001	The actor likely gathered USER1 account credentials in a data breach where account information appeared in publicly available channels.

Table 3: Initial Access

Technique Title	ID	Use
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts	T1078.002	The actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (USER1). The employee’s account was not immediately disabled after their departure.

Table 4: Persistence

Technique Title	ID	Use
External Remote Services	T1133	The actor connected a VM via the victim’s VPN to blend in with legitimate traffic to evade detection.

Table 5: Privilege Escalation

Technique Title	ID	Use
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts	T1078.002	The actor authenticated to multiple services from a compromised Global Domain Administrator account (USER2). The actor also authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints.
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts	T1078.004	The actor used a compromised account (USER2) which was synced to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD, thus enabling administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.

Table 6: Credential Access

Technique Title	ID	Use
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files	T1552.001	The actor likely obtained USER2 account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server where they were locally stored.

Table 7: Discovery

Technique Title	ID	Use
Account Discovery: Domain Account	T1087.002	Through the VM connection, the actor executed LDAP queries of the AD.
Remote System Discovery	T1018	Through the VM connection, the actor executed LDAP queries to collect user and host information.
Domain Trust Discovery	T1482	Through the VM connection, the actor executed LDAP queries to collect trust relationship information.
File and Directory Discovery	T1083	The actor authenticated to the CIFS on various endpoints likely for the purpose of file, folder, and directory discovery.
Network Service Discovery	T1046	The actor used the compromised USER1 account to authenticate to four services, presumably for the purpose of network and service discovery.

Table 8: Lateral Movement

Technique Title	ID	Use
Remote Services	T1021	The actor connected from an unknown VM and authenticated to multiple services via the USER1 account.
Remote Services: Cloud Services	T1021.007	The actor used the USER2 account, which granted access to the Azure AD, as well as the on-premises AD.
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	T1021.002	The actor used compromised accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block.

Table 9: Collection

Technique Title	ID	Use
Data from Information Repositories: SharePoint	T1213.002	The actor likely obtained the USER2 account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed by USER1.

MITIGATIONS

Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

Secure and Monitor Administrator Accounts

The threat actor gained access to the network via compromised administrator accounts that did not have MFA enabled. The compromised USER2 Global Domain Administrator account could have enabled the threat actor to move laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure tenant. In response to the incident, the victim organization removed administrator privileges for USER2. Additionally, the victim organization disabled unnecessary administrator accounts and enabled MFA for all administrator accounts. To prevent similar compromises, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:

• Review current administrator accounts to determine their necessity and only maintain administrator accounts that are essential for network management. This will reduce the attack surface and focus efforts on the security and monitoring of necessary accounts.
• Restrict the use of multiple administrator accounts for one user.
• Create separate administrator accounts for on-premises and Azure environments to segment access.
• Implement the principle of least privilege to decrease threat actor’s ability to access key network resources. Enable just-in-time and just enough access for administrator accounts to elevate the minimum necessary privileges for a limited time to complete tasks.
• Use phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) [CPG 2.H] (e.g., security tokens) for remote access and access to any sensitive data repositories. Implement phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail and VPNs—for accounts that access critical systems and privileged accounts that manage backups. MFA should also be used for remote logins [M1032]. For additional guidance on secure MFA configurations, visit CISA’s More than a Password webpage and read CISA’s Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA fact sheet.

Reduce Attack Surface

Unnecessary accounts, software, and services in the network create additional vectors for a threat actor to compromise. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:

• Establish policy and procedure for the prompt removal of unnecessary accounts and groups from the enterprise, especially privileged accounts. Organizations should implement a robust and continuous user management process to ensure accounts of offboarded employees are removed and can no longer access the network.
• Maintain a robust asset management policy through comprehensive documentation of assets, tracking current version information to maintain awareness of outdated software, and mapping assets to business and critical functions.
  • Determine the need and functionality of assets that require public internet exposure [CPG 1.A].
• Follow a routine patching cycle for all operating systems, applications, and software (including all third-party software) to mitigate the potential for exploitation.
• Restrict personal devices from connecting to the network. Personal devices are not subject to the same group policies and security measures as domain joined devices.

Evaluate Tenant Settings

By default, in Azure AD all users can register and manage all aspects of applications they create. Users can also determine and approve what organizational data and services the application can access. These default settings can enable a threat actor to access sensitive information and move laterally in the network. In addition, users who create an Azure AD automatically become the Global Administrator for that tenant. This could allow a threat actor to escalate privileges to execute malicious actions. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:

• Evaluate current user permissions in the Azure tenant to restrict potentially harmful permissions including:
  • Restrict users’ ability to register applications. By default, all users in Azure AD can register and manage the applications they create and approve the data and services the application can access. If this is exploited, a threat actor can access sensitive information and move laterally in the network.
  • Restrict non-administrators from creating tenants. Any user who creates an Azure AD automatically becomes the Global Administrator for that tenant. This creates an opportunity for a threat actor to escalate privileges to the highest privileged account.
  • Restrict access to the Azure AD portal to administrators only. Users without administrative privileges cannot change settings, however, they can view user info, group info, device details, and user privileges. This would allow a threat actor to gather valuable information for malicious activities.

Create a Forensically Ready Organization

• Collect access- and security-focused logs (e.g., intrusion detection systems/intrusion prevention systems, firewall, data loss prevention, and virtual private network) for use in both detection and incident response activities [CPG 2.T].
• Enable complete coverage of tools, including Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), across the environment for thorough analysis of anomalous activity and remediation of potential vulnerabilities.

Assess Security Configuration of Azure Environment

CISA created the Secure Cloud and Business Applications (SCuBA) assessment tool to help Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to verify that a M365 tenant configuration conforms to a minimal viable secure configuration baseline. Although the SCuBA assessment tool was developed for FCEB, other organizations can benefit from its output. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:

• Use tools that identify attack paths. This will enable defenders to identify common attack paths used by threat actors and shut them down before they are exploited.
• Review the security recommendations list provided by Microsoft 365 Defender. Focus remediation on critical vulnerabilities on endpoints that are essential to mission execution and contain sensitive data.

Evaluate Conditional Access Policies

Conditional access policies require users who want to access a resource to complete an action. Conditional access policies also account for common signals, such as user or group memberships, IP location information, device, application, and risky sign-in behavior identified through integration with Azure AD Identity Protection.

• Review current conditional access policies to determine if changes are necessary.

Reset All Passwords and Establish Secure Password Policies

In response to the incident, the victim organization reset passwords for all users.

• Employ strong password management alongside other attribute-based information, such as device information, time of access, user history, and geolocation data. Set a password policy to require complex passwords for all users (minimum of 16 characters) and enforce this new requirement as user passwords expire [CPG 2.A],[CPG 2.B],[CPG 2.C].
• Store credentials in a secure manner, such as with a credential manager, vault, or other privileged account management solution [CPG 2.L].
• For products that come with default passwords, ask vendors how they plan to eliminate default passwords, as highlighted in CISA’s Secure by Design Alert: How Manufacturers Can Protect Customers by Eliminating Default Passwords.

Mitigations for Vendors

CISA recommends that vendors incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their practices, limiting the impact of threat actor techniques and strengthening the secure posture for their customers.

• Prioritize secure by default configurations, such as eliminating default passwords and providing high-quality audit logs to customers with no additional configuration, at no extra charge. Secure by default configurations should be prioritized to eliminate the need for customer implementation of hardening guidance.
• Immediately identify, mitigate, and update affected products that are not patched in accordance with CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.
• Implement multifactor authentication (MFA), ideally phishing-resistant MFA, as a default (rather than opt-in) feature for all products.

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 2-9).
2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
3. Test your technologies against the technique.
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

CISA and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

RESOURCES

• MS-ISAC: Center for Internet Security (CIS) Cyber-Attack Defense: CIS Benchmarks + CDM + MITRE ATT&CK

REFERENCES

[1] CISA Analysis: Fiscal Year 2022 Risk and Vulnerability Assessments

DISCLAIMER

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or MS-ISAC.

VERSION HISTORY

February 15, 2024: Initial version.

CISA released seventeen Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on February 15, 2024. These advisories provide timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS.

• ICSA-24-046-01 Siemens SCALANCE W1750D
• ICSA-24-046-02 Siemens SIDIS Prime
• ICSA-24-046-03 Siemens SIMATIC RTLS Gateways
• ICSA-24-046-04 Siemens CP343-1 Devices
• ICSA-24-046-05 Siemens Location Intelligence
• ICSA-24-046-06 Siemens Unicam FX
• ICSA-24-046-07 Siemens Tecnomatix Plant Simulation
• ICSA-24-046-08 Siemens RUGGEDCOM APE1808
• ICSA-24-046-09 Siemens SCALANCE SC-600 Family
• ICSA-24-046-10 Siemens Simcenter Femap
• ICSA-24-046-11 Siemens SCALANCE XCM-/XRM-300
• ICSA-24-046-12 Siemens SIMATIC WinCC, OpenPCS
• ICSA-24-046-13 Siemens Parasolid
• ICSA-23-046-14 Siemens Polarion ALM
• ICSA-24-046-15 Siemens SINEC NMS
• ICSA-24-046-16 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk Service Platform
• ICSA-23-306-02 Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC iQ-F/iQ-R Series CPU Module (Update A)

CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisories for technical details and mitigations.

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens’ ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). 

View CSAF

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• CVSS v4 8.5
• ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity
• Vendor: Siemens
• Equipment: Polarion ALM
• Vulnerabilities: Incorrect Default Permissions, Improper Authentication

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow unauthenticated access or privilege escalation.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

Siemens reports that the following products are affected:

• Polarion ALM: all versions.

3.2 Vulnerability Overview

3.2.1 INCORRECT DEFAULT PERMISSIONS CWE-276

Siemens Polarion ALM is vulnerable due to weak file and folder permissions in the installation path. An attacker with local access could exploit this vulnerability to escalate privileges to NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM.

CVE-2023-50236 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2023-50236. A base score of 8.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N).

3.2.2 IMPROPER AUTHENTICATION CWE-287

The REST API endpoints of doorsconnector of the affected product lacks proper authentication. An unauthenticated attacker could access the endpoints, and potentially execute code.

CVE-2024-23813 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2024-23813. A base score of 6.9 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N).

3.3 BACKGROUND

• CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Critical Manufacturing
• COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
• COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany

3.4 RESEARCHER

Deniz Cevik from Cyberwise Turkiye and Michael Heinzl reported these vulnerabilities to Siemens.

4. MITIGATIONS

Siemens is preparing fix versions and recommends countermeasures for products where fixes are not, or not yet available.

Siemens has identified the following specific workarounds and mitigations users can apply to reduce risk:

• An administrator can restrict the file and folder path permissions post installation.
• If DOORS connector is not used in the environment, add the following in the Apache configuration to restrict unauthenticated access:
  Require all denied
• If DOORS connector is used in the environment, limit access to the doorsconnector endpoint to only the specific IP address of the DOORS instance that Polarion synchronizes its data with.

As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.

Additional information on industrial security by Siemens can be found on the Siemens industrial security webpage.

For more information see the associated Siemens security advisory SSA-871717 in HTML and CSAF.

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.

5. UPDATE HISTORY

• February 15, 2024: Initial Publication

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens’ ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). 

View CSAF

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• CVSS v3 5.3
• ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity
• Vendor: Siemens
• Equipment: RUGGEDCOM APE1808
• Vulnerability: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to obtain assets data without authentication.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following products with Nozomi Guardian/CMC are affected:

• RUGGEDCOM APE1808: All versions prior to 23.3.0

3.2 Vulnerability Overview

3.2.1 EXPOSURE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO AN UNAUTHORIZED ACTOR CWE-200

A missing authentication check in the WebSocket channel used for the Check Point IoT integration in Nozomi Networks Guardian and CMC, may allow an unauthenticated attacker to obtain assets data without authentication.

CVE-2023-5253 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 5.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

3.3 BACKGROUND

• CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Critical Manufacturing
• COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
• COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany

3.4 RESEARCHER

Siemens reported this vulnerability to CISA.

4. MITIGATIONS

Siemens recommends the following:

• Contact customer support to receive patch and update information.
• Use internal firewall features to limit access to the web management interface.

As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.

Additional information on industrial security by Siemens can be found on the Siemens industrial security webpage.

For more information see the associated Siemens security advisory SSA-665034 in HTML and CSAF.

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

5. UPDATE HISTORY

• February 15, 2024: Initial Publication

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens’ ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). 

View CSAF

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• CVSS v4 9.3
• ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity
• Vendor: Siemens
• Equipment: Location Intelligence Perpetual Large, Location Intelligence Perpetual Medium, Location Intelligence Perpetual Non-Prod, Location Intelligence Perpetual Small, Location Intelligence SUS Large, Location Intelligence SUS Medium, Location Intelligence SUS Non-Prod, Location Intelligence SUS Small
• Vulnerability: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to obtain full administrative access to the application.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following Siemens products are affected:

• Location Intelligence Perpetual Large (9DE5110-8CA13-1AX0): All versions prior to V4.3
• Location Intelligence Perpetual Medium (9DE5110-8CA12-1AX0): All versions prior to V4.3
• Location Intelligence Perpetual Non-Prod (9DE5110-8CA10-1AX0): All versions prior to V4.3
• Location Intelligence Perpetual Small (9DE5110-8CA11-1AX0): All versions prior to V4.3
• Location Intelligence SUS Large (9DE5110-8CA13-1BX0): All versions prior to V4.3
• Location Intelligence SUS Medium (9DE5110-8CA12-1BX0): All versions prior to V4.3
• Location Intelligence SUS Non-Prod (9DE5110-8CA10-1BX0): All versions prior to V4.3
• Location Intelligence SUS Small (9DE5110-8CA11-1BX0): All versions prior to V4.3

3.2 Vulnerability Overview

3.2.1 USE OF HARD-CODED CREDENTIALS CWE-798

Affected products use a hard-coded secret value for the computation of a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain full administrative access to the application.

CVE-2024-23816 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2024-23816. A base score of 9.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H).

3.3 BACKGROUND

• CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Multiple Sectors
• COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
• COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany

3.4 RESEARCHER

Siemens reported this vulnerability to CISA.

4. MITIGATIONS

Siemens has identified the following specific workarounds and mitigations users can apply to reduce risk:

• Location Intelligence Perpetual Large (9DE5110-8CA13-1AX0), Location Intelligence Perpetual Medium (9DE5110-8CA12-1AX0), Location Intelligence Perpetual Non-Prod (9DE5110-8CA10-1AX0), Location Intelligence Perpetual Small (9DE5110-8CA11-1AX0), Location Intelligence SUS Large (9DE5110-8CA13-1BX0), Location Intelligence SUS Medium (9DE5110-8CA12-1BX0), Location Intelligence SUS Non-Prod (9DE5110-8CA10-1BX0), Location Intelligence SUS Small (9DE5110-8CA11-1BX0): Update to V4.3 or later version. The update is available from Siemens Online Software Delivery (OSD).

As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.

Additional information on industrial security by Siemens can be found on the Siemens industrial security webpage.

For more information see the associated Siemens security advisory SSA-580228 in HTML and CSAF.

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability, such as:

• Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
• Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
• When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize VPNs may have vulnerabilities, should be updated to the most recent version available, and are only as secure as the connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

5. UPDATE HISTORY

• February 15, 2024: Initial Publication

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens’ ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). 

View CSAF

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• CVSS v4 9.1
• ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity
• Vendor: Siemens
• Equipment: SIDIS Prime
• Vulnerabilities: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, NULL Pointer Dereference, Infinite Loop

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated attacker with access to the network where SIDIS Prime is installed to reuse OPC UA client credentials, create a denial-of-service condition of the SIDIS Prime OPC UA client, or create a denial-of-service condition of the SIDIS Prime TLS service.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following Siemens products are affected:

• SIDIS Prime: All versions prior to V4.0.400

3.2 Vulnerability Overview

3.2.1 USE OF INSUFFICIENTLY RANDOM VALUES CWE-330

In OPC Foundation OPC UA .NET Standard codebase 1.4.357.28, servers do not create sufficiently random numbers in OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua before 1.4.359.31, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to reuse encrypted user credentials sent over the network.

CVE-2019-19135 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.4 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2019-19135. A base score of 9.1 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N.

3.2.2 NULL POINTER DEREFERENCE CWE-476

Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the “signature_algorithms_cert” TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognized signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a denial-of-service attack.

CVE-2020-1967 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2020-1967. A base score of 8.7 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N.

3.2.3 NULL POINTER DEREFERENCE CWE-476

The X.509 GeneralName type is a generic type for representing different types of names. One of those name types is known as EDIPartyName. OpenSSL provides a function GENERAL_NAME_cmp which compares different instances of a GENERAL_NAME to see if they are equal or not. This function behaves incorrectly when both GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME. A NULL pointer dereference and a crash may occur leading to a possible denial-of-service attack. OpenSSL itself uses the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes: 1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a CRL distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate. 2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the timestamp authority name (exposed via the API functions TS_RESP_verify_response and TS_RESP_verify_token). If an attacker can control both items being compared, then that attacker could trigger a crash. For example, if the attacker can trick a client or server into checking a malicious certificate against a malicious CRL, then this may occur. Note that some applications automatically download CRLs based on a URL embedded in a certificate. This checking happens prior to the signatures on the certificate and CRL being verified. OpenSSL’s s_server, s_client and verify tools have support for the “-crl_download” option which implements automatic CRL downloading and this attack has been demonstrated to work against those tools. Note that an unrelated bug means that affected versions of OpenSSL cannot parse or construct correct encodings of EDIPARTYNAME. However, it is possible to construct a malformed EDIPARTYNAME that OpenSSL’s parser will accept and hence trigger this attack.

CVE-2020-1971 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 5.9 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2020-1971. A base score of 8.2 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N.

3.2.4 LOOP WITH UNREACHABLE EXIT CONDITION (‘INFINITE LOOP’) CWE-835

The BN_mod_sqrt() function in openSSL, which computes a modular square root, contains a bug that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli. Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form. It is possible to trigger an infinite loop by crafting a certificate that has invalid explicit curve parameters. Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may thus be subject to a denial-of-service attack. The infinite loop can also be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit elliptic curve parameters.

CVE-2022-0778 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2022-0778. A base score of 8.7 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N.

3.2.5 LOOP WITH UNREACHABLE EXIT CONDITION (‘INFINITE LOOP’) CWE-835

An infinite loop in OPC UA .NET Standard Stack 1.04.368 allows a remote attackers to cause the application to hang via a crafted message.

CVE-2022-29862 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2022-29862. A base score of 8.7 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N.

3.3 BACKGROUND

• CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Multiple Sectors
• COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
• COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany

3.4 RESEARCHER

Siemens reported these vulnerabilities to CISA.

4. MITIGATIONS

Siemens has released a new version of SIDIS Prime and recommends users update to the latest version:

• Update to V4.0.400 or later version

Siemens has identified the following specific workarounds and mitigations users can apply to reduce risk:

• Enable encrypted communication between the affected product (OPC UA client) and the OPC UA server(s)

As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.

Additional information on industrial security by Siemens can be found on the Siemens industrial security webpage.

For more information see the associated Siemens security advisory SSA-108696 in HTML and CSAF.

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.

5. UPDATE HISTORY

• February 15, 2024: Initial Publication

View CSAF

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• CVSS v3 6.5
• ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity
• Vendor: Mitsubishi Electric
• Equipment: MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU and SIL2 Process CPU Module
• Vulnerability: Incorrect Privilege Assignment

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a non-administrator user to disclose the credentials (user ID and password) of a user with a lower access level than themselves.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

Mitsubishi Electric reports that the following MELSEC iQ-R Series products are affected:

• MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R08SFCPU: All versions
• MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R16SFCPU: All versions
• MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R32SFCPU: All versions
• MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU R120SFCPU: All versions
• MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R08PSFCPU: All versions
• MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R16PSFCPU: All versions
• MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R32PSFCPU: All versions
• MELSEC iQ-R Series SIL2 Process CPU R120PSFCPU: All versions

3.2 Vulnerability Overview

3.2.1 INCORRECT PRIVILEGE ASSIGNMENT CWE-266

Information disclosure vulnerability due to incorrect privilege assignment exists in MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU and SIL2 Process CPU modules. After a remote attacker logs into the CPU module as a non-administrator user, the attacker may disclose the credentials (user ID and password) of a user with a lower access level than the attacker by sending a specially crafted packet.

CVE-2023-6815 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).

3.3 BACKGROUND

• CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Critical Manufacturing
• COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
• COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Japan

3.4 RESEARCHER

Reid Wightman of Dragos Inc. reported this vulnerability to Mitsubishi Electric.

4. MITIGATIONS

When MELSEC iQ-R Series Safety CPU versions 27 or later is used with GX Works3 versions 1.087R or later, this attack can be prevented by enabling “communicating with only the enhanced version of vulnerability management of GX Works3” when writing user information to the CPU module. Mitsubishi Electric will implement the workaround in other products in the near future. Please contact your local Mitsubishi Electric representative to update your CPU module to the one listed above.

Mitsubishi Electric recommends that users take the following mitigation measures to minimize the risk of exploiting this vulnerability:

• Use a firewall or virtual private network (VPN), etc., to prevent unauthorized access when Internet access is required.
• Use within a LAN and block access from untrusted networks and hosts through firewalls.
• Use IP filter function to block access from untrusted hosts. For details on the IP filter function, please refer to the following manual for each product. “1.13 Security” – “IP filter” in the MELSEC iQ-R Ethernet User’s Manual (Application).
• Restrict physical access to the affected product as well as to the personal computers and the network devices that can communicate with it.
• Install antivirus software on your personal computer that can access the affected product.

For specific update instructions and additional details, see Mitsubishi Electric advisory 2023-021.

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability. CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

5. UPDATE HISTORY

• February 13, 2024: Initial Publication